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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PUNISHMENT
KYRON HUIGENS*

INTRODUCTION
Does a complete punishment theory require a particular theory
of legality, that is, a theory of what makes a valid legal rule valid?
I suspect that most punishment theorists' initial response to this
question will be contradictory. On one hand, it seems obvious that
a theory of punishment, if it is a theory of legal punishment, must
assume some account of legality. It seems equally clear which
theory of punishment matches which school of jurisprudence. We
assume that an aretaic theory is necessarily part of a natural law
jurisprudence or that a consequentialist punishment theory is tied
somehow to legal positivism. Fewer observers would make a
connection between Dworkinian jurisprudence and deontological
punishment theory, but a shared emphasis on moral principle and
right answers in hard cases makes it easy to draw an equally
plausible connection there. On the other hand, if, as this answer
assumes, we think of punishment theories as subdivisions of the
great traditions in moral philosophy, then this answer must be
wrong. Moral philosophy is orthogonal to jurisprudence-as the
plausible but entirely specious connection between Dworkin and
Kant indicates-and if this is so, then there is no necessary
connection between any particular jurisprudence and any particular
theory of punishment.
The fact that a theory of punishment does not require a theory of
legality is trivial. To say, for example, that an aretaic theory of
punishment can be reconciled with legal positivism means no more
than to say that an aretaic theory of punishment can be reconciled
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I wish to thank Scott Shapiro
and Benjamin Zipursky for their comments on earlier drafts. The mistakes that remain are
my own.
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with an interpretation of the gnostic gospels or a reading of Dr.
Seuss. For the advocate of a punishment theory, however, establishing this trivial point is not itself trivial. For many of those interested in punishment theory, the point will in fact be a revelation. It
is difficult to say how widespread this confusion is, but it seems
sufficiently widespread to merit attention and correction. It matters
to the field of punishment theory if a consequentialist in punishment theory dismisses natural law jurisprudence out of hand,
particularly if she then uses that dismissal as a reason to reject an
aretaic theory of punishment as well. To see that punishment theory
and jurisprudence are orthogonal to one another would have the
effect of removing this large and entirely illusory constraint on the
development of punishment theory.
The difficulty is that it is not clear that jurisprudence and
punishment theory really are orthogonal to one another. For one
thing, the presumed subordination of punishment theory to moral
theory is false. The moral justification of punishment is only one of
the standing questions that a theory of punishment addresses, if it
is meant to be a comprehensive theory of punishment. And most of
these other questions are not questions in moral theory. Instead,
most questions in punishment theory concern the description of
criminal law: What is the difference between a defense in the nature
of justification and a defense denying responsibility for wrongdoing?
Is culpability or, the term preferred here, criminal fault part of the
structure of wrongdoing? If so, does fault apply per offense or per
element? Does the term "excuse" refer to denials of responsibility,
to the absence of fault, or to both? Where does duress or provocation
fall in these categories?
Given punishment theory's large descriptive component, we might
begin to think that descriptive jurisprudence is not orthogonal to
punishment theory at all. It is true that the two disciplines as
ordinarily conducted have little or nothing to do with one another.
Jurisprudence is focused exclusively on explaining the validity of
legal norms, whereas the descriptive questions with which punishment theory is concerned ordinarily do not include the question of
legal validity. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that
punishment theory is not sensitive to differing conceptions of legal
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validity-as the intuition behind the first answer to the opening
question of this Essay indicates.
This Essay addresses the relationship between punishment
theory and jurisprudence, and argues for the idea that jurisprudence and punishment theory are orthogonal to one another. Part
I of this Essay, following this Introduction, will move punishment
theory closer to jurisprudence, first by describing the overbearing
role of moral philosophy in punishment theory as it is ordinarily
conducted, and then by separating and highlighting the features
of punishment theory that are descriptive and more concerned
with legality. Part II of this Essay will continue in the same vein,
beginning to treat the theory of punishment as legal theory instead
of moral theory. I will describe the four major schools of jurisprudence and sketch their accounts-some actual, some projected--of
criminal fault. The question is what would count as an acceptable
account of criminal fault-legal fault within a system of legal
punishment-under each school's conception of what counts as law?
Behind this lies the question whether jurisprudence is completely
orthogonal to punishment theory. Criminal fault is usually interpreted as a straightforward matter of moral desert for punishment.'
If this conception does not run afoul of any conception of the
relationship of law to morality, then this is a strong sign that
jurisprudence places no constraints on punishment theory at all. We
can return to the clarifying, simplifying idea that punishment
theory and jurisprudence are orthogonal to one another.
The effort to reconcile punishment theory with jurisprudence
across the board seems doomed, however, where an Aristotelian or
aretaic theory of punishment is concerned. The idea that virtue
plays a central role in criminal liability is most often and quite
understandably thought of as a feature of a natural law jurisprudence. An aretaic theory of punishment seems to be inconsistent on
its face with a positivist jurisprudence, if one interprets the absence
of virtue as a condition of just punishment and positivism as
excluding such moral concepts from the criteria of legal validity. But
1. See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll'sMental State or What Is Meant by Intent, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 71, 82 (2001) ("What we are seeking to punish in criminal law is sin, which
sometimes is referred to by the less religious sounding term, 'moral desert."' (footnote
omitted)).
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there is no reason to assume that positivism excludes moral
concepts from the criteria of legal validity. And even if it did, there
would be no conflict if an aretaic theory of punishment did not treat
the absence of virtue as a necessary or sufficient condition for
criminal liability. Parts III and IV of this Essay will pursue this
point. I will offer a distinctively aretaic account of criminal fault. I
will then offer an account of desert for legal punishment as legal
desert, exclusive of moral desert-an account that mimics a central
argument of exclusive legal positivism. These two different accounts
of fault, we will see, are perfectly consistent with one another-a
point which should conclusively dispel any notion that an aretaic
theory of punishment is a creature of natural law jurisprudence.
I. DESERT FOR PUNISHMENT AND THE SCAPEGOATING OBJECTION
It would be difficult to describe in a paper of any length how
punishment theory is ordinarily conducted. Here, I will only put
forward an instance of ordinary punishment theory, and proceed on
the assumption that it is reasonably representative. It is an
argument about desert for punishment-which, aside from the
justification of punishment, is the main issue in the field-and it
indicates the preoccupations of ordinary punishment theory. This
argument is a staple of criminal law classrooms, but upon closer
examination one begins to wonder why. It has nothing in particular
to do with law-which is the very feature that makes it representative.
The "scapegoating objection" is aimed particularly at consequentialist theories of punishment. To quote one statement of the
objection:
T]he utilitarian must hold that we are justified in inflicting pain
always and only in order to prevent worse pain or bring about
greater happiness. This, then, is all we need consider in so-called
punishment, which must be purely preventive. But if some kind
of very cruel crime becomes common, and none of the criminals
can be caught, it might be highly expedient, as an example, to
hang an innocent man, if a charge against him could be so
framed that he were universally thought guilty; indeed this
would only fail to be an ideal instance of utilitarian "punish-
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ment" because the victim himself would not have been so likely
as a real felon to commit such a crime in the future; in all other
respects it would be perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific.'
It is never quite clear, however, what this objection means. This
version of the objection is the one that John Rawls quoted in Two
Concepts of Rules, and he understood the point to be this: "The
question is whether utilitarian arguments may be found to justify
institutions ... such as one would find cruel and arbitrary."3 But
why should we care whether utilitarian arguments would justify
cruel and arbitrary punishments?
An answer to this question might be found in Rawls's plausible
argument against the scapegoating objection.4 It may be that
conditioning punishment on individual desert produces optimal
social welfare, simply because most people believe, rationally or not,
that this is how punishment should be done, and because they
would withhold necessary political support for the legal system if it
were done otherwise. If punishment according to desert is not cruel
and arbitrary, then a consequentialist theory of punishment would
not necessarily endorse cruel and arbitrary punishment in the
pursuit of optimal social welfare. For my present purposes, however,
it is irrelevant whether or not the scapegoating objection fails, and
whether or not consequentialist punishment theory is right. I want
to focus on why and how the scapegoating objection purportsto show
a consequentialist theory to be mistaken, whether it successfully
does so or not. On this point, Rawls's counterargument is unhelpful,
because it merely presents the question again. Granted that a
consequentialist theory of punishment does not necessarily endorse
2. E.F. CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
3. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 10 (1955).
4. The argument was formulated by several other philosophers as well. See, e.g., A.C.
EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT: WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A GENERAL THEORY OF

ETHICS 66 (1929) (noting that "it is the penal system as a whole which deters, and not the
punishment of a single offender"); J.D. MABBOTT, PUNISHMENT (1939), reprinted in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 39, 50 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (quoting
A.C. Ewing's "it is the penal system as a whole which deters" statement). The reply was also
given contemporaneously to Rawls in ANTHONY M. QUINTON, ON PUNISHMENT (1954),
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT, supra, at 55, 63. H.L.A. Hart also drew the
distinction, in terms of "general justifying aim" versus "distribution." H.L.A. HART,
Prolegomenon to the Principlesof Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 8-13 (1968) [hereinafter PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY].
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cruel and arbitrary punishment in the form of punishment regardless of desert, why does it follow that a consequentialist theory is
not objectionable?
Consider a different way in which the scapegoating objection
might fail. We might not care whether a scapegoat is punished. If
this seems implausible, consider a closely analogous case instead.
A number of states have abolished the insanity defense, and thus
authorize punishment for those who have long been thought not to
deserve punishment.' The reasoning behind this abolition seems to
be twofold: it will preclude the acquittal of malingerers, even at the
cost of punishing some genuinely undeserving defendants; and it
will send a strong deterrent message to potential wrongdoers. If
the scapegoating objection turns on our revulsion at undeserved
punishments being inflicted for deterrence's sake, then these
explanations give the punishment of the insane a strong odor of
scapegoating.
It might be as Rawls suggested that to punish without regard to
desert would cause a punishment system to lose critical political
support, so that only punishment according to desert will optimize
social welfare. Where the insanity defense has been abolished,
however, it appears that to punish without regard to desert garners
political support for the punishment system. With no offset for
dissatisfaction over punishment of the undeserving, punishing the
insane will produce optimal welfare-without the need to introduce
desert into the equation at all.
If we are not repelled by the infliction of undeserved punishment
for the sake of deterrence, then the scapegoating objection does not
work. The act-consequentialism that is the target of the scapegoating objection describes the abolition of the insanity defense
perfectly well, and makes sense of its scapegoating rationale. By
bolstering deterrence, albeit at the cost of punishing otherwise
legally irresponsible defendants, we enhance social welfare. Even in
its most primitive form, then, consequentialism makes sense of a
recent development that at first seems anomalous, even outrageous.
It explains scapegoating as well, avoiding any suggestion of
5. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207(1) (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1) (2005); see also Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2731-32
(2006) (holding that Arizona does not violate due process in restricting consideration of
defense evidence of mental illness and incapacity).
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difficulty in describing punishment in consequentialist terms. What
else should we expect from a theory of punishment other than an
accurate description of our actual practices and a cogent explanation
of the reasons behind them?
There may be no reason to expect something different from a
theory of punishment, but we do. The scapegoating objection is not
meant to evaluate theories of punishment. It is meant to evaluate
theories of just punishment. Consequentialism as a moral theory is
evaluated by running it up against common judgments about the
good or right action.6 Consequentialism as a punishment theory is
evaluated by running it up against common judgments about just
punishment. 7 Hence the scapegoating objection and consequentialism's purported error in describing punishment. To treat the
scapegoating objection as something other than a way to evaluate
theories of just punishment is to miss its point. It is no response to
the scapegoating objection to say that a simple act-consequentialism
describes existing practices perfectly well, if those practices themselves are implausible as instances of just punishment. This is why
my examination of the scapegoating objection above seems like a
willful misinterpretation of it.
This willful misinterpretation serves, nevertheless, to indicate a
potential for confusion between legal and moral theory. A theory of
just punishment is not necessarily a theory of legal punishment.
The scapegoating objection applies just as well to the punishment
of children and the sanctions of social etiquette. It would be unjust
to spank a child because I could not catch a different child who
broke a window. It would be unjust to disinvite one friend to my
party because I cannot disinvite the friend who insulted me, but
whose attendance is necessary to make the party a success. A
punishment theory that authorized these acts would seem to be
mistaken. But in this light, the scapegoating objection has nothing
in particular to do with law. To consciously pursue the theory of
punishment as legal theory would help to ensure that only legal
punishment, with its distinctive features, is under consideration.
6. See Kyron Huigens, Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'y 33, 34 n.6 (2003).
7. See Andrew R. Strauss, Note, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the
Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a UtilitarianModel of
Punishment, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 1549, 1560-61 (2002).
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Overlooking the difference between moral theorizing and legal
theorizing about punishment also clouds our thinking about desert,
leaving the relationship between moral desert and legal desert
unclear. The conception of desert that predominates in punishment
theory is desert as a moral condition of legal punishment; that is,
legal punishment is imposed only if punishment is morally deserved. George Fletcher makes the condition clear via an implicit
condemnation of consequentialist theories of punishments in this
passage:
If the law ignored the question of attribution, namely, the
question whether individuals were properly held accountable for
their wrongful acts, the criminal law undoubtedly would
generate some unjust decisions. If it were true that the only
relevant norms of the legal system were those of wrongdoing,
injustice would be inescapable in cases in which individuals
could not but violate the law. The insane would be punished like
the sane; those who acted under duress would be punished like
those who acted freely. If this were the English common law, one
might indeed need a utilitarian theory in order to make sense of
the systematic indifference to the accountability of individual
defendants. Yet this is not the law and it never has been the law
of any civilized society.8
The notion of desert as a moral condition of legal punishment is
stated expressly in this passage from Herbert L. Packer:
[The prevention of crime is the primary purpose of the criminal
law; but that purpose, like any social purpose, does not exist in
a vacuum. It has to be qualified by other social purposes,
prominent among which are the enhancement of freedom and
the doing of justice. The effectuation of those purposes requires
placing limits on the goal of crime prevention. Chief among those
instrumental limits is this one: a finding of moral responsibility
is a necessary although not a sufficient condition for determining
criminal guilt and meting out punishment for it.9

8. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 511 (1978).
9. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 16 (1968).
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Similarly, Hyman Gross writes: "Condemning one who is blameless
is universally abhorred as an injustice, and it is astonishing that
those who advocate criminal liability regardless of culpability do not
perceive this abhorrence as an insurmountable obstacle to the
adoption of their program."1 ° More recently, but in the same vein,
Paul Robinson writes of the defenses in general that, "taken
together, these doctrines serve 'to safeguard conduct that is without
fault from condemnation as criminal,' and it is the criminal law's
moral condemnation that distinguishes criminal liability from
civil."'" It seems a fair inference that Robinson too views moral
desert as a condition of legal punishment.
There are, however, two ways in which moral desert might serve
as a condition of legal punishment. It might serve as a condition of
just punishment or it might serve as a condition of valid punishment. One problem with punishment theory as it is ordinarily
conducted is that it usually is unclear which condition is being
examined. Fletcher and Gross appear to be describing moral desert
as a condition of just punishment; Packer appears to be describing
moral desert as a condition of valid punishment; and in the two
clauses of the quotation from Robinson he appears to be describing,
respectively, both aspects of desert. None of the four writers,
however, seems aware of this ambiguity. My purpose in the next
Part is to examine the less familiar use of moral desert-as a
condition of legal validity-in a descriptive jurisprudence of
punishment.
II. CRIMINAL FAULT AND MORAL FAULT
The use of moral desert as a condition of just punishment is so
unproblematic as to be invisible. The use of moral desert as a
condition of the legal validity of judgments of punishment has an air
of paradox. Granted that criminal law and ordinary morality are
parallel in many of their prohibitions and defenses, they are
nevertheless two distinct and different normative systems. To say
that moral desert is a condition of legal validity presents a picture

10. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 414-15 (1979).
11. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 9 (1997) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(c)
(1962)) (footnote omitted).
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of the jury's being required to leave law in order to find something
that cannot be found in law, but that law requires. Why should we
think that law is dependent on its sister normative system in this
way? If the law is dependent in this way, is this dependence an
innocuous feature or a genuine cause for concern? The obvious place
to look for an answer to these questions is modern jurisprudence, a
field in which the central question is the nature of legal validity and
its relationship to morality.
A. Nonpositivist Jurisprudenceand CriminalFault
In ordinary punishment theory, a judgment of legal punishment
is just, or valid, only if it imposes morally deserved punishment.12
Several senses of "desert" need to be distinguished, because one
plays a more prominent role than the others for present purposes.
The desert at issue in the scapegoating objection is desert as
identity and cause in fact. Desert in this sense is merely the attribution of wrongdoing to the proper agent. Criminal law addresses
desert in two other, more controversial senses, and does so in two
distinct categories of defense. The accused might deny that he is a
fully competent agent and, as such, a fair candidate for legal
punishment-as in the defenses of insanity, minority, or duress. Or
the accused might contest an aspect of the alleged wrongdoing itself:
the distinctive element in criminal offenses that is missing in cases
of mistake of fact or that is subjected to a complex, structured
adjudication in cases of provocation. 3 I will refer to the former kind
of desert as fair candidacy and to the latter kind as fault. This Essay
will focus on fault, because its being an aspect of legal wrongdoing
makes the paradox noted above more acute here than elsewhere. In
what follows, references to "desert" should be read as references to
"fault," unless otherwise noted.
Taking up the main argument again, consider John Finnis's
description of criminal fault:

12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. As I have explained elsewhere, the prevailing views of provocation as a partial excuse
or a partial justification are wrong. Provocation is a doctrine of nonintentional fault, or, as it
is more widely known, objective culpability. Kyron Huigens, Liberalism, Normative
Expectations, and the Mechanics of Fault,69 MOD. L. REv. 462,472-73 (2006).
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Sanctions are punishment because they are required in reason
to avoid injustice, to maintain a rational order of proportionate
equality, or fairness, as between all members of the society. For
when someone, who really could have chosen otherwise, manifests in action a preference (whether by intention, recklessness,
or negligence) for his own interests, his own freedom of choice
and action, as against the common interests and the legally
defined common way-of-action, then in and by that very action
he gains a certain sort of advantage over those who have
restrained themselves, restricted their pursuit of their own
interests, in order to abide by the law.14
Notice three things here. Finnis's concern is legal punishment in
particular, not punishment in general. This description of fault does
not apply to the punishment of children or social sanctions on
violations of etiquette, neither of which concerns "the legally defined
common way-of-action."15 Second, fault is described as integral to
criminal wrongdoing, implying that it is a necessary condition on
liability for such wrongdoing. And third, the fault at issue here is
moral fault, because it pertains to "a rational order of proportionate
equality ... as between all members of the society."' 6 For Finnis,

then, a legal judgment of punishment is valid only if it imposes
morally deserved punishment.
Finnis's description of fault is a description of valid punishment,
not just punishment because it is fully integrated into his natural
law jurisprudence. Finnis accepts a critical component of H.L.A.
Hart's account of law: his argument that law is not merely a system
of commands backed by threats. 7 Instead, from the "internal point
of view," it is clear that law creates a sense of obligation and a basis
for criticism of actions inconsistent with law.' 8 And Finnis agrees
with Hart that the correct perspective for theorizing about law is the
internal point of view-that of a participant in the legal system who
feels obligations within the system.' 9 But Finnis argues that the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

JOHN
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

FINNIs, NATuRAL LAW AND NATuRAL RIGHTS 262-63 (1980).
263.
262.
7.
12.
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internal point of view can be and should be further specified.2"
Participants in the system vary in their allegiances and attitudes to
law, so there is a choice to be made about the participant whose
view of law matters. 2 ' The central or focal case of the internal point
of view is that of a person of sound morality or, more precisely, a
person of practical reasonableness.22 From this, Finnis concludes:
A sound theory of natural law is one that explicitly, with full
awareness of the methodological situation just described,
undertakes a critique of practical viewpoints, in order to
distinguish the practically unreasonable from the practically
reasonable, and thus to differentiate the really important from
that which is unimportant or is important only by its opposition
to or unreasonable exploitation of the really important. A theory
of natural law claims to be able to identify conditions and
principles of practical right-mindedness, of good and proper
order among men and in individual conduct.23
for his own
A person who "manifests in action a preference ...
interests, his own freedom of choice and action, as against the
common interests and the legally defined common way-of-action"2 4
does not appreciate or act according to "principles of practical rightmindedness, of good and proper order among men and in individual
conduct."2 5 This is criminal fault as moral fault, full stop.
A Dworkinian account of criminal fault likewise identifies
criminal fault with moral fault. Ronald Dworkin, like Finnis,
describes legal validity in terms of moral validity. His famous claim
that there are right answers in hard cases means that when the law
is unclear, or when there is no applicable law on a given question,
law can be extended by means of interpretation to provide a legally
valid answer.2" Validity depends on whether the law, so interpreted,
maintains its integrity;2" an interpretation maintains the law's
20. See id. at 13.
Id.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 18.
RoNALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 255-56 (1986).
Id. at 257-58.
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integrity if it puts the law in its best moral light; and the law is
placed in its best moral light when it demonstrates equal concern
and respect for persons.2"
Dworkin has not given us an account of criminal fault,29 but
Jeremy Horder's recent book on the excuses (a British term that
translates into absence of fault in American terms)3 ° offers an
explicitly Dworkinian view. Horder proposes three novel defenses,
"suggesting three ways in which the law should be developed to
become distinctively liberal in its excusatory outlook."3 1 According
to Horder, those defendants who are "short-comer[s]" fail at least
sometimes because of their mental or emotional make-up.3 2 One of
his defenses, for example, would allow a defendant "to combine
evidence of lost self-control following something rather less than the
gravest of provocations, with evidence of a mental deficiency falling
short of insanity or of some other serious mental disorder."3 3
Horder describes a key feature of his distinctively liberal
approach to criminal fault when he writes that "[f] act-finders should
be provided with a more general, formal means of expressing an
opinion about the moral appropriateness of conviction." 4 He
describes his proposed defenses as serving the Dworkinian legal
values of equal concern and respect,3 5 and argues that the defenses
contribute to reciprocity between society and the individualanother value in Dworkinian political morality. This reciprocity,
Horder argues, entails an opportunity for the defendant to raise
moral arguments against criminal liability:
As when murder is reduced to 'voluntary' manslaughter, there
is thus a formal role at the stage of conviction itself for the factfinder to decide the fate of the offender on a broader range of
moral criteria than is currently possible, whether or not the

28. Id. at 215-16.
29. The closest he has come to doing so is a short critique of one of Hart's arguments from
Punishment and Responsibility.RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 8-13 (1977).

30. See Huigens, supra note 13, at 466.
31. JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 197 (2004).

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

163.
150.
144.
4.
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definitional elements of the offence in question involve some
kind of moral appraisal.3 6
These defenses are proposals for liberal law reform, but Horder's
description of them is a philosophical account of criminal fault in
Dworkinian terms.
This description of the absence of fault in terms of morally
defensible acts is substantively indistinguishable from Finnis's
description of criminal fault as a feature of morally condemnable
acts. Both descriptions, significantly, are integrated into a larger
conception of legal validity. The implication is that a judgment of
punishment is legally valid only if punishment is morally deserved.
B. Inclusive Legal Positivism and CriminalFault
Although legal positivists insist on the conceptual separation of
law and morality, they do not reject the notion that morality can be
incorporated into accounts of legal validity, and would not reject a
rule that legally valid punishment must be morally deserved.
H.L.A. Hart rejected the simplistic view that crime "is the
'intentionalor reckless doing of a morally wrongact,"'37 and carefully
distinguished between the principle that it is morally wrong to
punish those whose wrongdoing is not voluntary (or intentional),
and the principle that only those who have voluntarily (or intentionally) committed a moral wrong may be punished.3" Nevertheless,
Hart's essays on punishment strongly suggest that criminal fault
can be construed as moral fault.
In Punishmentand the Eliminationof Responsibility,Hart wrote:
Human society is a society of persons; and persons do not view
themselves or each other merely as so many bodies moving in
ways which are sometimes harmful and have to be prevented or
altered. Instead persons interpret each other's movements as
manifestations of intentions and choices .... The bearing of this

fundamental fact on the law is this. If as our legal moralists
36. Id. at 146.
37. H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibilityand Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 4, at 28, 36 (quoting JEROME HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 149 (1947)).
38. Id. at 38-39.
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maintain it is important for the law to reflect common judgments of morality, it is surely even more important that it

should in general reflect in its judgments on human conduct
distinctions which not only underly [sic] morality, but pervade
the whole of our social life.39
The phrasing here suggests that the question is prescriptive,
concerning how the law ought to be written. The passage, however,
occurs in a discussion of whether desert has any necessary connection to retributivist, or deontological, accounts of criminal fault, to
the exclusion of consequentialism. ° That is, the discussion occurs
at the same level of controversy occupied by the scapegoating
objection-that concerning the choice of theory. Hart's argument is
offered in support of the thesis that our choice of theory should not
be affected by our views on moral fault, because moral fault can be
a feature of criminal fault on any theoretical description of legal
punishment. This argument assumes that morality can be implicit
in criminal fault as a descriptive matter.
This reading is consistent with Hart's "soft" or inclusive legal
positivism. Another of Hart's key innovations, in addition to his
description of the internal point of view, is the notion of a rule of
recognition. A rule of recognition is a social rule that determines
legal validity; for example, laws passed by Congress in accordance
with constitutional procedure should be followed. A rule of recognition is constituted by a community's engaging in a certain practice
with the attitude that the practice is obligatory. 4 ' Ronald Dworkin's
major objection to Hart's jurisprudence concerned the place of moral
principles in the rule of recognition. Dworkin argued that the sense
of obligation and the intelligibility of criticism that bring a rule of
recognition into existence could not be the product of a social
practice itself, but that they must be separately premised on
morality. Because the rule of recognition cannot validate moral
principles, moral principles are prior to the rule of recognition. A

39. H.L.A. HART, Punishmentand the Eliminationof Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILTY, supra note 4, at 158, 182-83.
40. Id. at 177.
41. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 256-57 (2d ed. 1994).
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rule of recognition must incorporate moral principles in order to do
the job Hart described.4 2
In response, Hart and other positivists conceded the role of moral
principles and asserted that they could indeed be incorporated into
a rule of recognition. Dworkin had argued that controversial moral
claims could not be incorporated into the rule of recognition without
fatally detracting from its central role as Hart had described it:
providing certainty about which rules ought to be followed in an
environment of conflicting and evolving duties and prohibitions. To
incorporate morality into the rule of recognition, Dworkin alleged,
would render a legal system unstable, from Hart's point of view.43
Hart replied that the tolerable level of uncertainty in a legal system
varies, and so there is no reason to expect the incorporation of moral
principles in a rule of recognition to cause instability. 4 Dworkin also
argued that legal positivism is motivated by doubts about moral
realism and alleged a resulting positivist rejection of moral criteria
in law. 45 Hart denied that any such antirealist motivation can be
found in legal positivism, because legal positivism is simply agnostic on the question of moral realism. If a rule of recognition
incorporates a moral principle, then "whatever the answer is to this
philosophical question, the judge's duty will be the same: namely,
to make the best moral judgment he can on any moral issues he may
have to decide. 46
This last point deserves emphasis for reasons more central to this
Essay's purpose. First, a valid legal judgment, no less than a valid
legal rule, is identified by a rule of recognition. That a judgment is
directed to legal officials instead of ordinary citizens-that it is a
secondary rule instead of a primary rule-does not deprive it of its
conduct-guiding function.4 7 My judgment that my rival should be
imprisoned is no more valid than my decree that all persons should
defer to me in all matters. A rule of recognition tells us this. The
same rule tells us that a judgment and sentence issued by a court
42. DWORKIN, supranote 26, at 39-45.
43. See RONALD DWORKIN, RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 248

(Marshall Cohen ed., 1983).
44. HART, supra note 41, at 251-52.
45. DWORKIN, supranote 43, at 250.
46. HART, supra note 41, at 254.
47. See JOSEPH RAZ, The Functions of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW

AND MORALITY 163, 178 (1979).
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of general jurisdiction in any of the United States does indeed
authorize the imprisonment of the offender described in that
judgment, just as it purports to do.
Second, the proposition that a judgment of punishment is legally
valid only if punishment is morally deserved describes a rule of
recognition for such judgments. For example, suppose that strict
criminal liability results in judgments of punishment when
punishment is not morally deserved-perhaps the most common
understanding of strict criminal liability.4 8 Strict criminal liability
was at one time alleged to be invalid under the Fifth Amendment.4 9
Constitutional provisions are paradigmatic rules of recognition, and
they often impose moral requirements. The due process challenge
to strict criminal liability was an assertion of a rule of recognition
to the effect that a judgment of punishment is valid only if punishment is morally deserved. As Hart's reply to Dworkin indicates,
Hart's jurisprudence does not deny that judges make such moral
decisions.' Inclusive legal positivism, no less than non-positivist
jurisprudence, recognizes a role for moral desert in determining
legal validity.
C. Exclusive Legal Positivism and CriminalFault
As the name implies, exclusive legal positivism excludes moral
principles from rules of recognition; more specifically, from the
sources of such rules. Hart's positivism rests on a social thesis: the
notion that a rule of recognition is the product of social practices.5
Nothing in the social thesis bars moral principles from a role in the
recognition. In contrast, Joseph Raz advances a
origins of a rule5of
"sources thesis." 2 A rule of recognition is not only a social practice.
48.
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and
evil.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
49. See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910).
50. See HART, supra note 41, at 247.
51. See id. at 115-17.
52. JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHIcs IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS
IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITIcS 194, 195 (1994) [hereinafter ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
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It must also have a legal pedigree; that is, one must be able to trace
the rule of recognition back to a legal institutional source.53
The exclusion of moral principles from the sources of a rule of
recognition is a product of a particular conception of authority, a
"service" conception, that strongly distinguishes legal norms from
other norms. 4 The service provided by law is the exclusion of
reasons that might mislead one into ill-considered action. This
conception of authority is analogous to Raz's conception of the role
of rules in practical reasoning.5 We have reasons for action, and
practical rationality consists largely in our acting on the balance of
reasons. However, we also have second-order reasons-reasons
about reasons-that sometimes dictate that we not act on the
balance of reasons.5" Rules are second order, exclusionary reasons
of this kind. A rational rule points us toward action according to the
balance of reasons in a range of similar situations of choice. If we
follow a rule consistently, we will inevitably find ourselves acting
against the balance of first-order reasons on some occasions. But
this is still rational, because the rule has enabled us to act in
accordance with the balance of reasons in the vast majority of cases.
The rule, moreover, has enabled us to do this both consistently and
without further hazardous and costly deliberation.
Authority is like rules in this respect. The justification of
authority lies in the fact that an individual has a better chance of
acting consistently according to right reasons if he follows the
directives of authority.5 7 The directives of an authority might be
based on reasons that apply to individuals making their own
decisions. After the reduction of ordinary reasons into a rule,
however, the rule must preempt the reasons on which an individual
might have acted. This is part of the nature of authority as Raz
describes it, using an arbitration as his example:

DOMAIN].

53. See JOSEPH RAZ, The Relevance of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra
note 52, at 261, 280 n.28.
54. RAZ, supra note 52, at 198-99.
55. Id.; see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 63-64 (Princeton Univ. Press
1990) (1975).

56. RAZ, supra note 55, at 39-40.
57. RAZ, supra note 52, at 198-99.
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Two features [of the arbitrator's authority] stand out. First, the
arbitrator's decision is for the disputants a reason for action.
They ought to do as he says because he says so. But this reason
is related to the other reasons which apply to the case. It is not
just another reason to be added to the others, a reason to stand
alongside the others when one reckons which way is better
supported by reason. The arbitrator's decision is meant to be
based on the other reasons, to sum them up and to reflect their
outcome.58
Raz continues:
The arbitrator's decision is also meant to replace the reasons on
which it depends. In agreeing to obey his decision, the disputants agreed to follow his judgment of the balance of reasons
rather than their own. Henceforth his decision will settle for
them what to do.... Because the arbitrator is meant to decide on
the basis of certain reasons, the disputants are excluded from
later relying on them. They handed over to him the task of
evaluating those reasons. If they do not then reject those reasons
as possible bases for their own action, they defeat the very point
and purpose of the arbitration. The only proper way to acknowledge the arbitrator's authority is to take it to be a reason for
action which replaces the reasons on the basis of which he was
meant to decide."9
Without this peremptory force, the reasons that an authority gives
are not authoritative at all. "What distinguishes authoritative
directives is their special peremptory status. One is tempted to say
that they are marked by their authoritativeness." °
The exclusive nature of Raz's legal positivism is dictated by this
conception of authority. Moral reasons can be reasons on which law
is based, because they are reasons for which individuals act. But
once the law is adopted, these moral reasons themselves can no
longer guide action. They are reasons that legal authority preempts.
Without its peremptory force-law's power to exclude nonlegal
reasons-legal authority is not authoritative. Because law must be
58. Id. at 196.
59. Id. at 196-97.
60. Id. at 196.
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the kind of institution that at least purports to exercise authority,
a rule of recognition cannot be the product of moral reasons in the
way that Dworkin claims it must be,61 and that inclusive legal
positivism concedes it is. A rule of recognition that lacks authority
cannot legally determine the validity of other rules.
Suppose a rule of recognition were to have a moral principle as its
source. In order to determine the existence of a rule of recognition,
one would have to apply the moral principle. But if this were done,
then the rule of recognition would not authoritatively determine
legal validity. Instead, the existence of the rule of recognition itself,
and hence the validity of legal rules under it, would depend on the
dictates of the moral principle. In any conflict between the legal rule
and the moral principle, the latter would control. The rule of
recognition itself would lack peremptory force, and would not be
authoritative. The social practices constituting the rule of recognition can consist only of the actions and intentions of legal authorities. The constituent social practices of a rule of recognition must
have legal pedigrees.6 2
As with inclusive legal positivism, however, nothing that has been
said so far precludes a rule of recognition's appealing to morality in
its content, as opposed to its sources. To say the rule of recognition
must be the product of legal sources, excluding moral principles, is
not to say that a rule of recognition cannot invoke or advert to a
moral principle as a criterion of legal validity.
A clear case in point is constitutional adjudication of the
interpretation and application of bills of rights. Rights of
freedom of expression, assembly, the free exercise of religion,
freedom of movement, privacy, non-discrimination, and others
are typically declared in broad terms, and the courts are left free
to develop legal doctrines giving these rights concrete content in
light of sound moral considerations.'
61. See id. at 206-10.
62. There is an obvious chicken-and-egg problem here: if the rule of recognition identifies
valid legal rules, then what identifies the valid legal rules that make up the pedigree of the
rule of recognition? This problem is the starting point of Scott Shapiro's defense of exclusive
legal positivism. Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in HARTS POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE
PosTscRur TO THE CONCEPTOF LAw 150, 152 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
63. JOSEPH RAZ, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIc DOMAIN,
supra note 52, at 261, 318.
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Criminal law has analogous features. Criminal codes commonly
contain terms such as "malice,"' "depraved mind,"" "heinous,
atrocious, and cruel,""6 and "extreme indifference to the value of
human life."6 The moral content of these criteria is plain, as is that
of any rule of recognition that requires finding them as a condition
of a legally valid judgment of punishment. But nothing in exclusive
legal positivism rules them out for either role.
A judgment of punishment pursuant to a set of jury instructions
containing these morally charged terms is obviously valid. The
claim that a judgment of punishment is valid only if punishment is
morally deserved is a perfectly good rule of recognition under either
inclusive or exclusive legal positivism. The due process challenge to
strict criminal liability was the assertion of a rule of recognition
such as that described by Raz in the passage quoted just above-a
claim about the content and meaning of a bill of rights." The
content of this rule of recognition appeals to moral criteria-the due
process value of fundamental fairness in particular-but nothing in
exclusive legal positivism rules out such an appeal.
A conflict between ordinary punishment theory and exclusive
legal positivism would arise only if the pedigree of this rule of
recognition were said to have a moral component. For example,
assume that the passages above from Fletcher, 9 Robinson, °
Packer,7 ' and Gross" assert a rule of recognition, the content of
which is that a judgment of punishment is valid only if punishment
is morally deserved. Only the further claim that morality is the
source of this rule of recognition runs into trouble, because exclusive
legal positivism requires a legal institutional source for this rule.
This rule of recognition cannot itself be required by morality.

64. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought.").
65. See, e.g., Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of
Mens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 437 (1990) (summarizing the history of depraved-mind
murder).
66. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(h) (1962).
67. See, e.g., id. § 210.2(1)(b).
68. RAZ, supra note 63, at 318.
69. FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 511.
70. ROBINSON, supra note 11, at 9.
71. PACKER, supranote 9, at 16.
72. GROSS, supra note 10, at 414-15.
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We seem now to have reached a dead end in describing ordinary
punishment theory in jurisprudential terms. As noted above, it is
simply unclear whether Fletcher, Robinson, Packer, or Gross means
to describe a rule of recognition at all when he asserts that legal
punishment should be morally deserved. That is, it is unclear
whether they view judgments of punishment that violate the
requirement of moral desert as invalid judgments, or as valid
judgments that are unjust. It is even less clear whether, assuming
that one of them does mean to describe a rule of recognition, he
would claim that this rule of recognition has a moral source or an
exclusively legal source. Exclusive legal positivism rules out the
former and requires the latter, but whether there is a conflict
between exclusive legal positivism and ordinary punishment theory
on this point is unclear.
D. The PeculiarJurisprudentialProblem of Aretaic Punishment
Theory
An Aristotelian or aretaic theory of punishment, in contrast,
suffers from a peculiar and inconvenient clarity on this point. That
theory is apparently tied to a single conception of the sources of
legal validity. The most obvious jurisprudential home of a punishment theory drawing on virtue ethics is a natural law theory, such
as the jurisprudence of John Finnis, which grounds both moral and
municipal law in the common good.73 Virtue is not, as colloquial
usage suggests, a matter of strict adherence to a moral code. Virtue
consists of a perspicacious practical reasoning exercised only by
those whose desires are well-ordered with respect to the common
good, as a result of their attention to and respect for the common
good in their long-term deliberations on ends.74 An aretaic theory of
punishment portrays criminal fault as a failure in deliberations on
ends, culminating in the criminal act. v" Such a theoretical account
73. See FINNIS, supra note 14, at 100-03.
74. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1423, 1449-54 (1995).
75. See, e.g., id.; Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress:A PhilosophicalAccount of the Defense in
Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 278-79 (1995); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BuFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 575 (1998); Samuel Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 106,
150-51 (1996). More precisely, fault described as a failure in deliberations on ends includes
not only vice, but also akrasia-theinability to conform conduct even when one can see the
virtuous course of action. Nonfaulty or, in British theoretical terms, excused conduct, includes
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of criminal fault echoes Finnis's description of fault as involving
an actor's "preference (whether by intention, recklessness, or
negligence) for his own interests, his own freedom of choice and
action, as against the common interests and the legally defined
common way-of-action. 7 An aretaic theory's implicit jurisprudence
of punishment can easily be seen as a natural law jurisprudence
that "undertakes a critique of practical viewpoints, in order to
distinguish the practically unreasonable from the practically
reasonable," and that identifies the "conditions and principles of
practical right-mindedness, of good and proper order among men
and in individual conduct." 7
If an aretaic theory of punishment were grounded in natural law
jurisprudence, then the validity of a judgment of punishment and its
underlying finding of fault would not depend on a rule of recognition
with exclusively legal sources. It would not depend on a rule of
recognition at all. Finnis asserts that legal validity requires a
principle of practical reasonableness, or morality, that supersedes
the role of a rule of recognition.
By his decision to stipulate that o is legally obligatory for X, a
person with authority to make laws brings it about that (i) o is
legally obligatory and thus (presumptively) that (ii) o is morally
obligatory. But ...
these consequences flow not from any "force"
of the lawgiver's "superior will," but from the interrelationship
between (a) the fact that he has thus decided and (b) a "higher"
(or "deeper") principle that makes that fact legally and/or
morally significant. In a strictly legal analysis, that further
principle will consist in some law which imputes legal effect to
specified types of legislative act ....
And in the wider perspective
of practical reasoning, which includes but goes beyond the
confines of legal reasoning, the relevant further principles will
be the principles that the common good is to be advanced, that
authoritative determination of co-ordination problems is for the

not only virtuous conduct but also enkratic-merely prudent, rule-abiding---conduct. Kyron
Huigens, On Aristotelian CriminalLaw: A Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POLY 465, 493 (2004).
76. FINNIS, supra note 14, at 262-63.
77. Id. at 18.
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common good, and that legal regulation is (presumptively) a
good method of authoritative determination.7"

For Raz, in contrast, law has a distinctive authority that is inconsistent with morality's playing the role Finnis envisions.79
However, an Aristotelian conception of criminal fault need not be
tied to a natural law jurisprudence. Practical reasonableness need
not play the role with respect to fault that Finnis describes. A theory
of legal punishment might be recognizably Aristotelian because it
draws on other features of virtue ethics instead, such as its
distinctive moral particularism, its use of abductive reasoning,"° its
rich conception of deliberation on ends, and its resulting account of
responsibility for ends. A conception of criminal fault that I call the
specification account of fault draws on these features of aretaic
moral theory, and is unlike Finnis's conception of criminal fault. Let
me lay out this aretaic description of criminal fault as briefly as I
can in Part III of this Essay. This will serve to separate my version
of aretaic punishment theory from that suggested by Finnis. How
thoroughly this separation can be done will be the subject of Part

IV.
III. THE SPECIFICATION AccouNT OF CRIMINAL FAULT
In order to conclusively separate aretaic punishment theory from
natural law jurisprudence, we might seek a conception of legal
desert for punishment, as opposed to moral desert for punishment.
78. Id. at 334-35 (footnote omitted). It should be noted, however, that the passage is
significantly ambiguous. One can read Finnis to say that a principle of morality makes a legal
rule valid, without recourse to a rule of recognition; or that a rule of recognition must require
a principle of morality. As I read it, the "strictly legal analysis" that involves a rule of
recognition is not the same as "legal reasoning," in which case a rule of recognition would be
an alternative to "the wider perspective or practical reasoning." However, it might be that the
"strictly legal analysis" that involves a rule of recognition is the same as the "legal reasoning"
that is a subset of "the wider perspective of practical reasoning," making a rule of recognition
a part of that wider perspective. The latter reading seems more natural from the text alone,
but because it would make Finnis an inclusive legal positivist, it seems unlikely in the end.
79. See RAZ, supra note 52, at 198-99.
80. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

161-62 (1997) (explaining abductive reasoning); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence
and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 1024-25 (2000) (using abductive reasoning to
describe criminal wrongdoing in virtue-ethics terms).
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Rawls described legally deserved punishment as punishment for the
violation of a legal prohibition.8 Given that this conception of legal
desert covers not only strict criminal liability but also scapegoating
within the rule of law, it is obviously too strong. Furthermore, to say
that a judgment of punishment is legally valid only if punishment
is legally deserved seems vacuous. For reasons such as these,
punishment theorists have skipped over the notion of legal desert
and have resorted immediately to moral desert in describing legally
valid judgments of punishment. But a precise conception of legal
desert is neither too strong nor vacuous. Such a conception of legal
desert is to be found in an aretaic theory of punishment, in a
theoretical description of criminal fault that I call the specification
account.
Under an aretaic theory, criminal fault is an inference, drawn in
the course of the adjudication of wrongdoing, to the effect that the
practical reasoning of the defendant is deficient.8 2 This deficiency is
relevant in one way or another to most of the reasons usually cited
as functions of punishment: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation,
education in public norms, and social catharsis. Practical reasoning
is deficient if it pays no heed to public norms, if the reasoning agent
is not deterred by the prospect of punishment, and so on. This
assessment of the quality of the defendant's practical reasoning is
not limited to his reasoning in connection with the offense-even if
"in connection with" is given a very broad construction. It extends,
in addition, to an assessment of the defendant's set of standing
motivations, or ends-to their acquisition, development, maintenance, and ultimate issuance in the alleged offense.' From an
opposite perspective, criminal fault is an aspect of criminal wrongdoing. That is, the manner, circumstances, and specifics of the
individual instance of wrongdoing alleged against the defendant are
the subject matter of the adjudicative assessment of the quality of
his practical reasoning just described.
This adjudicative assessment of fault is complementary to the
statute's general prohibition. From the point of view of an assessment of the quality of practical reasoning, the legislation of a
81. Rawls, supranote 3, at 7-8 & n.8.
82. Huigens, supra note 75, at 487-89.
83. See id. at 487.
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criminal prohibition is a generalization about how people have
reasoned well or poorly in a large set of specific, more or less
similar, cases. A jury determining criminal liability applies the
prohibition to a particular set of facts, and in the course of determining the relevance of one to the other the prohibition is made more
specific. In other words, a finding on fault requires the jury to
return the general prohibition to the level of specificity at which it
originated. At this specific level, the actual course that the defendant followed, and the quality of decisions he made in that regard,
can be meaningfully assessed under the general prohibition. With
respect to the justification of punishment, this complementary
specification of the prohibition brings whatever justifying force the
prohibition has down into the individual case.
The specification of a criminal prohibition in adjudication is the
process usually referred to as the jury's applying the law to the
facts.' It is different from both the interpretation of the prohibition's terms and the exercise of discretion in order to fill its interstices. Specification is a reciprocal process involving the selection of
facts that are relevant to the prohibition, and the reinterpretation
of the prohibition's positive terms in light of the facts selected.8" For
example, one jury whose deliberations were videotaped considered
the case of a defendant who was charged with being a felon in
possession of a weapon.' He had honestly but imprudently complied
with a police officer's request to bring his handgun into the station.
The videotape shows the jury working over the word "know" in its
instructions in light of the fact that the defendant clearly did not
grasp the significance of his action. They painstakingly revised
"know" to mean something closer to "appreciate," so as to account
not only for the cognitive dimension of the defendant's practical
reasoning but also for its evaluative and motivational dimensions.
In this way, they avoided the unjust result that would have followed
from a simpler application of their instructions." Similarly, one can
84. This description of specification draws heavily on Darryl K. Brown, PlainMeaning,
Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal
Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
85. Id. at 1219-21.
86. See Frontline:Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast Apr. 8,1986) (televising
a jury deliberation).
87. See Brown, supranote 84, at 1245-49.
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easily imagine the case of a sympathetic defendant who did not face
either an imminent threat of death or circumstances that reasonably explain his highly emotional resort to violence-leaving him in
a gap between two defenses. It would not be surprising to find a jury
faced with such a case reinterpreting "imminence" or "threat" in
order to expand self-defense; or shifting the focus of its provocation
instructions from an objective evaluation of the defendant's
emotional distress to a more subjective one. Similarly, a jury might
interpret its instructions on accomplice liability so as to contract the
liability of a minor participant, or read its instructions on attempt
so as to reduce the exposure of an otherwise appealing attempter
who does not renounce completely, or in time, or who abandons his
attempt in response to a threat of detection. All of this activity falls
well short of nullification.' It is, instead, a normal feature of the
adjudication of criminal fault.
Criminal law does not merely tolerate the specification of its
prohibitions in adjudication; it relies on specification to inject a
necessary measure of moral particularism into its processes.
Specification serves the criminal law's concern with granularity.
Granularity can be defined as the relative level of under- and overinclusiveness in our rules of criminal liability, relative to a background of moral desert; or defined, alternatively, as the degree of
congruence between our legal judgments of desert and our moral
judgments of desert. Granularity affects the moral and political
authority of criminal law, and is a function of two conflicting ends
of the law: moral particularity and formality. The pursuit of legal
formality bolsters respect for criminal law by reducing arbitrariness
and unpredictability in the legal system; but this pursuit entails
both the creation of interstices associated with rules, and also a loss
in sensitivity to context. The pursuit of moral particularity, on the
other hand, accommodates a public that has little tolerance for
counterintuitive legal judgments. But of course it requires a
relaxation of formality and detracts from our pursuit of traditional
rule of law values such as notice of the prohibition and legislation
ex ante. Granularity is addressed at several points in criminal
law-including resort to objective fault criteria in the drafting of
88. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1149, 1169-71 (1997)
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offenses89 and the tradition (nearly lost, but now reviving) of judicial
discretion in sentencing--but the jury's specification of the
prohibition in adjudication is the most important phase in this
effort, if only because it bears most immediately on the central
question of the guilt or innocence of individuals. Specification of the
prohibition in the adjudication of fault is essential to the regulation
of granularity, and thus to the criminal law's moral and political
authority.9
The specification of a criminal prohibition determines criminal
fault-legal desert for legal punishment. Desert for punishment is
notoriously difficult to define, but specification plainly aims at it.
Think about what we do know about desert for punishment. It is
some quality of the prohibited act over and above the nominal
violation of the prohibition's terms; beyond, but related to, the
prohibited act or result. The nearly universal resort to moral fault
for the theoretical description of this quality indicates that desert
for legal punishment is informal and particularistic. This particularistic evaluation has something to do with the defendant's
practical reasoning-as evinced by the nearly universal resort to
intentional states of mind in order to describe criminal fault
doctrinally. And yet desert for punishment notoriously cannot be
captured by intentional states alone; it involves a broader evaluation of practical reasonin92--as evinced in the resistance of
nonintentional fault criteria to mid-twentieth-century efforts to
eradicate them from modern criminal codes. The specification
account of criminal fault describes each of these aspects of desert
for legal punishment, in its description of the criminal prohibition's
transformation, for adjudicative purposes, into a particularistic,
relatively informal evaluation of the quality of the defendant's
practical reasoning, emphasizing particularly his deliberations on
ends.
The same features of the specification account of criminal fault
make it a distinctively aretaic account. Virtue ethics notoriously
89.
(2002).
90.
(2005).
91.
92.

See Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 121-25
See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1069
See id. at 1063-65.
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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subordinates the role of rules in morality to the quality of the
agent's practical reasoning. 3 It is characteristically particularistic
in its emphasis on context-sensitive judgment in the evaluation of
practical reasoning. And the distinctive feature of the aretaic
analysis of responsibility is its focus on the agent's ends and on the
quality of the deliberation that has contributed to the choice of
ends.94
In spite of its aretaic characteristics, however, the specification
account of fault is not tied to natural law jurisprudence in the way
that Finnis's account of criminal fault is. Finnis describes criminal
fault as the offender's manifesting a preference for his own interests
as against "the legally defined common way-of-action."9 5 This focus
on practical reasoning with specific reference to legal norms tells us
that this is an account of legal fault-as opposed to fault in family
or social contexts. But criminal fault is otherwise indistinguishable
from moral fault. Criminal fault is a failure of "practical rightmindedness" with respect to the "good and proper order among men
and in individual conduct."' It is, in other words, moral fault in a
legal context. This treatment of the legal as a category of the moral
is characteristic of natural law theories, as evinced by Finnis's
appeal to practical reasonableness, or morality, as the criterion of
legal validity.97
Like Finnis's natural law account of criminal fault, the specification account focuses on the quality of the offender's practical
reasoning. The specification account of fault, however, describes
criminal fault as something other than moral fault in a legal
context. For one thing, the objectives of the adjudication of fault, on
the specification account, go beyond ensuring that legal punishment
in the particular case is morally defensible, and extends to objectives that are specifically legal-most notably, the regulation of
granularity in legal punishment and the resulting preservation of
the moral and political authority of the criminal law. But even when
the issue is the morality of punishment in the individual case, the
specification account describes the determination of legal desert, not
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Huigens, supra note 89, at 105-07.
Huigens, supra note 74, at 1452-54.
FINNIS, supra note 14, at 262-63.
Id. at 18.
See id. at 290.
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moral desert. Its evaluation of practical reasoning is conducted
exclusively in terms of the particular criminal prohibition at issue.
This inquiry into practical reasoning is not only bound to, but is
complementary to the positive criminal law. The moral justification
it provides to the individual case of punishment is the same moral
justification that supports the criminal prohibition itself. It is not,
as ordinary punishment theory seems to have it, a mere sideconstraint-a freestanding inquiry into the moral defensibility of
punishment in the case. This is so because the deficient practical
reasoning that indicates fault is the same deficient practical
reasoning in the same practical context leading to the same
objectionable acts that have been generalized in order to frame the
relevant criminal prohibition to begin with.
I believe that the argument so far is sufficient to separate the
aretaic theory of punishment-of which the specification account of
criminal fault is a centerpiece-from natural law jurisprudence,
including the sophisticated modern form of it developed by Finnis.
In Part IV, I hope to take this line of thinking one step further, and
to develop more fully the argument that the specification account of
fault is an account of legal desert for legal punishment. The
argument will expand on the idea that the evaluation of practical
reasoning in the adjudication of fault is conducted exclusively in
terms of the particular prohibition at issue.
IV. THE SERVICE ACCOUNT OF CRIMINAL FAULT

In this Part, I will formulate an account of criminal fault that
mimics Raz's service account of legal authority.9" Call it the service
account of criminal fault. Whereas Raz describes the source of
rules of recognition as exclusively legal, I will describe the source of
judgments of punishment as exclusively legal. In jurisprudential
terms, I will describe a rule of recognition for valid judgments of
punishment-one that could appeal to morality under either
positivist school of jurisprudence, as we have seen, but that does not
in fact appeal to morality.
This service account of criminal fault describes the determination
of legal, not moral desert for punishment. The argument is that,
98. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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because the specification account of criminal fault is consistent with
the service account of criminal fault, the specification account also
describes the determination of legal, not moral, desert for punishment. The immediate objective is to undermine the prevailing
notion that desert for legal punishment is simply moral desert in a
legal context. By framing criminal fault in radically different terms
from its natural law version, we can more thoroughly distinguish
between aretaic punishment theory and natural law jurisprudence.
Unless this is done, the development of an aretaic theory of
punishment might be hobbled in the way that I described at the
outset. There should be no question that its acceptance is in any
way conditioned on the acceptance of a particular conception of
legality. The ultimate objective of this argument is to defend an
aretaic theory of punishment.
Raz's service conception of authority describes a distinctive
feature of legal rules. An authoritative reason for action is not just
another reason. An authority's directives ordinarily will be based
upon and will reflect the reasons for which individuals act. But an
authoritative reason for action is exclusive: it preempts further
appeal to the reasons that precede the authoritative determination
and directive. 9 Authority is not authoritative without this preemptive force. The service conception of authority implies that legal
validity cannot have a moral source. 10 0 Legal validity is determined
by a rule of recognition, and a rule of recognition is a legal rule. A
rule is not a legal rule if it does not have the preemptive force of
legal authority. But a legal rule that permitted a direct appeal to
the moral reasons that lie behind it would not have preemptive
force. A rule of recognition, then, cannot and does not permit a
direct appeal to the moral reasons that lie behind it. Legal validity,
in other words, does not have a moral source.
The service conception of authority applies not only to rules of
recognition, of course, but to any other legal rule and also to legal
judgments, such as the ruling of an arbitrator, in Raz's example
above. 1 1 To see what a legally valid judgment of punishment looks
like from the point of view of a service conception of authority, start

99. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
100. See RAZ, supra note 52, at 198-99.
101. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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two procedural steps forward from the jury's finding of criminal
fault. In the paradigmatic criminal case, a jury's finding on criminal
fault is embodied in a verdict. A jury verdict is an authoritative
legal directive to another legal actor. The trial judge is bound by the
verdict to enter a particular judgment concerning punishment. The
trial judge cannot adduce moral reasons and enter a judgment that
contradicts or alters the verdict. If this were done, if the verdict
were treated as just another reason supporting the judgment, then
the verdict would lack peremptory force. Without that peremptory
force, it would not be authoritative and could not be described as
law. For all we know so far, a verdict might consist of or incorporate
moral reasons. But given that a verdict is law, peremptorily binding
on a judge entering judgment, a legal judgment of punishment does
not consist of or incorporate moral reasons; the verdict on which it
is based excludes them.
Taking one procedural step back, we can see that a verdict in a
criminal case cannot consist of or incorporate moral reasons,
particularly with respect to a finding of criminal fault. A jury's
finding on fault is an authoritative legal directive to another legal
actor. The jury at that later stage of its deliberations at which it
issues its verdict is bound to issue a verdict reflecting its precursor
finding on criminal fault. The jury cannot later adduce moral
reasons and enter a verdict that contradicts or alters its precursor
finding on fault, as happens in cases of jury nullification. °2 If this
were done, if the finding on fault were treated as just another
reason supporting the verdict, then the finding on fault would lack
peremptory force. Without that peremptory force, it would not be
authoritative, and could not be described as law. For all we know so
far, a finding of criminal fault might consist of or incorporate moral
reasons. But given that a finding of fault is law, peremptorily
binding the jury when it later issues its verdict, a verdict does not
consist of or incorporate moral reasons; the finding of fault on which
it is based excludes them.
Taking one last step backward, we can see that a finding on
criminal fault cannot consist of or incorporate moral reasons. The
law of the jury's instructions is obviously authoritative for the jury.
A deliberating jury is bound to make a finding on fault that accords
102. See Brown, supra note 88, at 1169-71.
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with its instructions. The jury cannot adduce moral reasons and
make a finding on fault that contradicts or alters its instructions. If
this were done, if the instructions were treated as just another
reason supporting the finding on fault, then the law of the instructions would lack peremptory force. Without that peremptory force,
this law would not be authoritative, and could not be described as
law. For all we know so far, the law of the instructions might consist
of or incorporate moral reasons-and in fact, a legislature's appeal
to moral reasons at that point would not detract from law's authority. But given that the law of the instructions is law, peremptorily
binding the jury when it makes its finding on fault, a finding on
fault does not consist of or incorporate moral reasons; the law of the
instructions on which it is based excludes them.
A jury's decision on criminal fault under the service account does
not identify "conditions and principles of practical right-mindedness,
of good and proper order among men and in individual conduct," as
Finnis says.1" 3 A finding on criminal fault is not an opportunity "for
the fact-finder to decide the fate of the offender on a ... range of
moral criteria," as Horder's Dworkinian account would have it. 10 4 It
does not necessarily require that a jury "reflect in its judgments on
human conduct distinctions which ... underly [sic] morality," as Hart
describes it.' Instead, the service account describes the determination of fault exclusively in terms of the particular criminal prohibition at issue, without reference to morality."°

103. FINNIS, supra note 14, at 18.
104. HORDER, supra note 31, at 146.
105. HART, supra note 39, at 183.
106. One point of clarification is needed at this juncture. Because terms such as "malice,"
"depraved heart," and "extreme indifference to the value of human life" are common features
of criminal law doctrine on fault, it might seem that morality cannot be entirely excluded from
the description of criminal fault, even on the services account. It is important to recognize,
however, that such doctrinal fault concepts are criterial, not constitutive. They are indicators
of fault; not fault itself. The choice of these nonintentional or objective fault criteria, or the
rejection of them in favor of intentional-states criteria, is a function of the competing ends of
formality and moral particularity, and a device in regulating the granularity of criminal law.
The theoretical descriptions of fault offered here, both the service and specification accounts,
concern the requirement of legal punishment for which such frankly moral terms are criteria.
Because such fault criteria are entirely dispensable from a theoretical point of view-if not
from a doctrinal, political, or moral point of view-their common occurrence is irrelevant to
the theoretical description of criminal fault and to the formulation and evaluation of the
service and specification accounts of fault under consideration.
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I appraised the specification account of criminal fault in similar
terms above, as fault described in terms of the particular criminal
prohibition at issue, concluding that it was therefore legal fault and
not moral fault. But that conclusion now seems doubtful, because
the specification account seems to exclude morality less strictly than
the service account of fault does. The specification account of fault
claims that the adjudication of fault returns the prohibition to the
level of specificity at which individual persons made better and
worse practical judgments that were then generalized in the form
of a criminal prohibition. If this is so, then moral reasons that lie
behind the prohibition have been revived. This seems flatly
inconsistent with the service account of criminal fault, because it is
a return by the jury to the reasons that precede positive law. In
terms of the service account of criminal fault given above, these
theoretical descriptions part company at the critical juncture
between the jury's finding of fault and the law of its instructions.
One way to answer this objection is to note that the particularistic
reasoning that is a feature of the specification of a prohibition is not
necessarily moral reasoning, meaning that morality does not detract
from legal authority under the specification account of criminal
fault. An aretaic theory of punishment relies on the distinctive
particularism of virtue ethics. Aristotle recognized that practical
reasoning occurs in a fact-rich context. He described guidance by
norms in these terms, stressing the particularity of practical
reasoning, and showing how norm guidance could be particularistic
as well. He broadened the frame of reference to include the practical
reasoning that precedes particular choices, including deliberations
on ends, and showed how these prior choices and deliberations
07
contribute to choices on the occasion of action, via character.
Particularistic practical reasoning is a matter of perceptions and
desires that have been shaped and informed by norms' influence
on character development. In other words, particularistic norm
guidance operates by means of virtue. A virtue ethics theory of
punishment posits that guidance by criminal prohibitions and the
ex post normative evaluation of behavior subject to a prohibition is
particularistic in this way. But this particularistic norm guidance
107. See T.H. Irwin, Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S
ETHICS 117, 128-29, 142-44 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
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is neither distinctively moral nor distinctively legal. The specification account of criminal fault is an instance of this particularistic
account of norm guidance, but it does not, for this reason, introduce
morality into legal guidance in a way that detracts from legal
authority.
This argument, however, does not really answer the objection; it
just gives it a finer point. Granted that the particularistic reasoning
described in the specification account of fault is not moral reasoning,
what detracts from authority is not morality per se, but the revival
of reasons of individuals-which might or might not be moral
reasons. The objection against the specification account of criminal
fault is, more precisely, that reasons are facts,"'8 and the jury's
selection of and apportioning weight to facts in light of the prohibition seems to be the revival of the reasons that have guided
authority in its determination of the prohibition, but that cannot be
appealed to after that determination without infringing on that
authority.
This more precise objection, however, is just as easily answered.
Reasons are facts, but, of course, they are not only facts. A reason
is a fact that gives a person a positive attitude toward a particular
act. A fact that is a reason for an act by one person is not necessarily
a reason for another person to perform the same act-it might or
might not so dispose the latter person. A fact that is a reason for a
particular act is not necessarily, or even usually, a reason for a
different act, no matter how similar the two acts might be. To say
there is a "revival" of reasons in the specification account of fault is
imprecise and misleading. The reasons of individual persons that
are generalized into a prohibition are the reasons of persons
different from the jury or jurors. None of the acts of persons that are
generalized into a prohibition is the same act that the jury performs
in specifying the prohibition for purposes of adjudication or in
issuing its verdict.
The specification account of criminal fault, then, is consistent
with the service account. The accounts differ in the direction in
which each description moves-from a legislated prohibition to a
finding of fault to a judgment of punishment, or from a judgment of
punishment to a finding of fault to the legislated prohibition. But
108. See RAZ, PRACTIcAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 55, at 16-18.
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neither theoretical account introduces moral norms along the way,
or suggests a rule of recognition for valid judgments of punishment
containing anything but pedigreed legal norms.
This point should disabuse anyone interested in punishment
theory of the most common misunderstanding concerning an aretaic
theory. The connection between legal desert and virtue does not lie
in the defendant's morally deserving punishment because he lacks
virtue. This is how criminal fault is described in Finnis's natural
law jurisprudence. °9 In my version of an aretaic theory, however,
the connection runs instead from the adjudicative specification of
the criminal prohibition in the jury's determination of criminal
fault, to the legislation of the prohibition, and thence to that
prohibition's origin in the generalization of individual practical
judgments that are better and worse with respect to practical
reasonableness. This aretaic account of criminal fault has no
connection to a natural law jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION

An Aristotelian theory of punishment initially seems compatible
with only a modern natural law jurisprudence. This appearance
both lends support to, and draws support from a common but clearly
mistaken belief that particular punishment theories and particular
schools of jurisprudence have some necessary relationship. This
Essay sought to clear up this confusion by addressing, first, the
extent to which punishment theory is misdirected in its focus on
moral desert for punishment. On the other hand, the use of moral
theory in punishment theory is not illogical. Desert for legal
punishment is usually described as moral desert for punishment,
and these are perfectly good descriptions. At least, the identification
of moral desert for punishment and legal desert for punishment is
not ruled out by any of the leading schools of jurisprudence-a fact
which, given the diversity of those schools, further emphasizes that
punishment theory conducted by reference to moral theory is
orthogonal to jurisprudence.
An aretaic theory of punishment presents a special case of
confusion over this point, because it is notoriously bound up with a
109. See FINNIS, supra note 14, at 35-36.
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natural law jurisprudence. This Essay sought to dispel this impression thoroughly, by describing the aretaic conception of criminal
fault, by then offering a second conception of criminal fault exclusive
of moral fault, and by then reconciling these two seemingly
disparate accounts. Thus an aretaic theory of punishment can offer
an account of exclusively legal desert for legal punishment. This
should suffice to dispel conclusively the idea that an aretaic theory
of punishment is a creature of natural law jurisprudence, and also
the wider confusion of which this is the most plausible and persistent instance.

